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A. Abstract 
Mazmanian and Sabatier advocate the importance of legislation for successful policy 
implementation.  Scholars such as Perkmann have identified structural factors that affect regional 
cooperation.  Under Workforce Investment Act, legislative and structural factors in obtaining 
regional cooperation across traditional state and local government boundaries are analyzed in 
nine U.S. Midwestern metropolitan regions.  Results from this study suggest there are policy 
design and structural factors such as the focus of actors; same year implementation of the act; 
and the amount of hierarchical integration of administrative entities that can be enhanced to 
increase the likelihood that regional cooperation will occur under WIA.   
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A. Policy Design and Regional Cooperation under the Workforce Investment Act  
  
The cooperation of implementing agencies can result in better program outcomes.  Cooperation 
has the potential to reduce redundancy and costs while providing more comprehensive service 
for clients.  Regional cooperation in transportation policy, for example, resulted in effective 
transportation systems across metropolitan areas and the construction of a coherent interstate 
highway system.  Regional cooperation, however, has been used only sparingly in the 
implementation of employment and training legislation. The Comprehensive Employment Act of 
1973 (CETA) which authorized financial incentives to encourage the formation of consortia is 
one example. Under CETA in 1973 consortia, which are jurisdictions that voluntarily work 
together to plan and deliver services across juridical lines, began to spring up.  By 1975 one-third 
of the 402 prime sponsors were consortia (Mirengoff and Rindler 1976).1 Outcomes under the 
Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) of 1982 also provided additional momentum to consider 
regional cooperation.  During the period of JTPA, poor coordination with employers was 
"leading the government to train people for jobs that were in short supply or unavailable" 
(Congressional Quarterly 2002, 573).  In response, the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 
(WIA), the most recent employment and training legislation, provided provisions to encourage a 
regional approach to implementing the policy.2  WIA encouraged states and agencies to 
cooperate when they share a stake in the performance of economic regions that cut across their 
borders as well as within their borders.3 Specifically, this policy recommends that workforce 
investment board (WIB) areas that are contained within the same economic region cooperate 
across their borders.4 
This study examines regional cooperation under the most recent employment and training 
legislation, WIA.  There have been some instances of cooperation under WIA but not much is 
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know about their impact. Two conceptual frameworks are used to examine the policy design of 
WIA in terms of the statute’s capacity to achieve regional cooperation.  This study specifically 
examines regional cooperation under WIA and addresses three questions:  Is regional 
cooperation taking place?  To what extent does the legislation provide enabling mechanisms for 
regional cooperation? How do various state and local structures affect regional cooperation?  To 
accomplish this, the study draws from Mazmanian and Sabatier’s as well as Perkmann’s 
frameworks to focus on just two forces – the legislative factors identified by Mazmanian and 
Sabatier and local structural factors as identified by Perkmann.  Perkmann’s work also provides a 
useful definition of cooperation specific to identifying economic regional cooperation across 
state and local boundaries of intergovernmental relations.  Data from case studies, other 
scholarly research, and public documents on WIA implementation were used to generate 
hypotheses from these well developed theories about factors that contribute to regional 
cooperation under WIA.  
A. Regional Cooperation 
Research on regional cooperation is suggestive of why it may be important in employment and 
training policy but also difficult to achieve.  Regional cooperation can be beneficial because 
cooperation can increase efficiency (as can privatization) but only cooperation also provides the 
benefits of equity and democratic accountability to citizens as well as efficiency (Warner and 
Hefetz 2002).  Regional cooperation is only likely when there is a perceived need as well as a 
tradition of cooperation or when norms exist that promote cooperation (Olberding 2002).  
Scholarship has explored, in-depth, the types of agencies and officials that are more likely to 
cooperate.  In general a person’s position (e.g., management, field worker or professional) is a 
salient factor in driving their likelihood to engage in collaborative behavior (Thomas 2003; 
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Bardach 1998).  There is also a vast literature on conditions of networks and multiple actors that 
can foster smooth running operations and successful policy implementation (see O’Toole 2000; 
Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2001; Milward and Provan 1998; Agranoff and McGuire 2003, 1998).  
Although the potential mechanisms for gaining cooperation appear to be many, research 
also reveals there are serious impediments to obtaining regional cooperation.  One obvious 
obstacle is our fragmented system of governance with federal, regional, state, and local 
authorities that have agencies and officials at each level.  These multiple layers can complicate 
obtaining policy cooperation even with the best policy prescriptions.  Downs contends true 
metropolitan level regional cooperation is unlikely even though the long term benefits are many.   
Downs finds that the local, state, and federal resistance is staunch enough to prevent the regional 
metropolitan level solidarity needed to achieve objectives (1994).  Lowery finds that the 
dominance of regional or local political structures depends on whether individuals see particular 
issues such as economic development, access to housing, sanitation and police services as having 
metropolitan-wide implications (2000).  Along these same lines researchers have found local 
autonomy which supports uniqueness and community identity can thwart regional cooperation 
and even promote fragmentation in the form of segregation by race and class, for example 
(Lowery 2000; Warner and Hefetz 2002).  When localities seek to maximize the positive 
attributes and minimize the negatives it is evident that Tiebout’s (1956) classic argument is at 
work.  Practically, his theory translates into communities competing for opportunities to increase 
their revenues while also trying minimize the exposure to elements that might be considered less 
desirable such as subsidizing housing.  This competition may enhance efficiency but does 
nothing to foster equity or cooperation.  In employment and training policy there is a long history 
of cooperation problems where both business and labor are mobile.  Program officials have a 
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desire to meet both employer and employees needs as well as attain programmatic success in 
terms of performance indicators.   It is easy to imagine how this work climate could give way to 
competition over cooperation.  Clearly individuals, their roles, perspectives, and institutions play 
a large part in determining whether cooperation occurs.  Yet, perhaps there are structural 
elements that could influence these individuals to create an environment conducive to regional 
cooperation in employment and training policy.   
A. Conceptual Framework 
Mazmanian and Sabatier, in their book Implementation and Public Policy (1983), specifically 
assert that the capacity of a statute to structure implementation is vital to the policy process and 
outcomes.  The framework they developed identifies three factors in the implementation process: 
(1) tractability of the problem, (2) the ability of the statute to structure implementation and (3) 
non statutory variables that affect implementation. The second factor specifically identifies 
several key elements that address whether the legislative statute structures effective 
implementation.  This second factor has six elements that are important to examine when 
evaluating the potential of a policy to generate successful outcomes: (1) clear and consistent 
policy directives; (2) valid causal theory and jurisdiction provided; (3) legislation structures 
implementing process; (4) commitment and skill of top implementing officials; (5) continuing 
support from constituencies and sovereigns and; (6) changing socioeconomic conditions.   
To analyze the inherent strengths and weakness in legislation Mazmanian and Sabatier 
outline variables to examine in their third element: the legislation’s structures for the 
implementing process.  Specifically, there are five variables for assessing the strengths and 
weakness of federal legislation on this element.  They are assignment to a sympathetic agency, 
hierarchical integration of semiautonomous bureaucracies, supportive decision rules, financial 
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resources, and formal access (1983).  There is no variation among the cases on the assignment to 
a sympathetic agency (in all cases the lead agency is the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL)) so 
this factor is not included in the research model.  The variable, supportive decision rules, has also 
been excluded as the rules are the same in all jurisdictions and therefore would not be a factor 
that would distinguish the potential for regional cooperation from one area over another area.   
The remaining three variables are considered in this analysis. The first variable is whether 
the legislation enhances the opportunity to obtain hierarchical integration of semiautonomous 
bureaucracies.  In the specific case of WIA, do states actively re-organize administrative entities 
overseeing WIA implementation? Are sanctions and incentives great enough to achieve 
cooperation among semiautonomous bureaucracies?  Second, the financial resources must be 
sufficient to achieve the objectives.  Does WIA provide adequate funding or at least a minimum 
threshold of funds for increasing cooperation?  And finally, there must be formal access for 
outsiders to participate to facilitate meeting objectives.  Does WIA provide sufficient access by 
the clients, individuals and business, to ensure they can cooperate?   
Mazmanian and Sabatier’s criteria provide specific ways to study how well WIA 
legislation encourages regional cooperation in the employment and training system.  This is 
valuable as Keiser and Meier note that policy design theories are difficult to test and future 
research would benefit from creating more parsimonious models.  They contend that design 
factors that policy makers can or should change are the most important to examine (1996).  
Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill also recommend parsimony as well as explaining government outcomes 
in a way that demonstrates an awareness of multiple levels of interaction in governance regimes 
(2001).  Recognizing both the need for parsimony in research and that states, localities, and 
regions are implementing the legislation, it is necessary to include their local structures when 
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examining the legislative outcomes.  It is for this reason that Perkmann’s framework for 
understanding cooperation across boundaries is necessary and complements the use of 
Mazmanian and Sabatier’s variables.  The two conceptual frameworks together illuminate the 
inherent strengths and weaknesses of the policy design in terms of the statute’s capacity to 
structure implementation under specific local conditions.   
Perkmann’s study, Cross-Border Regions in Europe: Significance and Drivers of 
Regional Crossborder Co-operation, identifies two specific factors that are salient in this study.  
The factors are the type of region and level of actors involved in obtaining cooperation across 
traditional boundaries.  Perkmann classifies the geographical areas as small or large but all are 
cross-border because they are contiguous.  Small territories include less than five jurisdictions.  
Large areas have five or more jurisdictions.  The level of actor refers to whether regional or local 
officials are the driving force behind the cooperation.  In this study, regional bodies are formed 
for the purpose of fostering the implementation of workforce development.  The regional bodies 
are not tied to federal, state or local bodies per se, but individual members may have ties to any 
one of these units of government or the non-profit or private sectors.  They may be mandated by 
a state plan or state level official or a voluntary association.  Regional bodies have the interest of 
the region in mind as opposed to a particular jurisdiction.  
The dependent variable, intensity of cooperation, is drawn from Markus Perkmann’s 
(2003) categorizations for measuring regional cooperation in economic markets in other nations 
and is adapted for use in this model.  Perkmann’s definition is particularly appropriate for use in 
this study as both studies are measuring cooperation in economic regions that cross traditional 
political boundaries.  Perkmann defines cross border cooperation (CBC) as being necessarily in 
the realm of  public agencies.  It is a collaboration between sub national authorities whereby 
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these actors are normally not legally bound to one another by international law.  They are 
therefore not allowed to conclude international treaties with foreign authorities and consequently 
are considered as engaging in a lower-level of politics.  Subsequently, CBC tends to be informal 
or quasi-jurisdictional between the authorities.  The foremost concerns of CBC involve practical 
problem solving on any broad range of areas in every day administrative issues.  Finally, CBC 
also includes a “stabilization of cross–border contacts, i.e., institution–building, over time” 
(Perkmann, 156).  
Perkmann indicates that cooperation takes different forms ranging from legal and binding 
public law to non binding arrangements (2003, 159).  It is necessary to adapt Perkmann’s 
definition somewhat to fit a national system with independent states as compared to the nation-
state arena.  Perkmann used the presence of legal or binding authority as one variable to help 
make the determination of the intensity of cooperation.  The determination of intensity was 
modified in this study slightly.  The modification stems from the fact that WIA permits legal 
arrangements to be made through Memorandums of Understanding but it does not, in and of 
itself, grant legal authority to create institutions.  As such the level of cooperation intensity in 
this study takes into consideration the formality of the governing body but not necessarily its 
legal authority.  That is to say there may be formal and even in some cases informal associations 
or institutions recognized as representing the interests of the region on workforce development.  
However, under WIA this group has no binding authority with the participating entities but 
rather functions under tacit agreements or understandings with its members.   
Perkmann’s definition points to two key elements to determine the intensity of 
cooperation: intensity of the act; and formality of the institutional arrangement.  In the long run 
the formality of the organization may breed even more cooperation through institution building 
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over time.  However, the definition presented here is about gauging the amount cooperation 
regionally at that time.  The type and intensity of the arrangement for cooperation are both used 
to measure the level of cooperation as an outcome.  The varying degrees of cooperation are 
depicted in a two by two table as seen in Figure 1.  
[Insert Figure 1 about Here] 
The levels of cooperation are derived from a combination of factors.  If a region has both 
a low level of intensity of cooperative actions and lacks formal organizing mechanisms, then low 
cooperation may be detected.  Yet, if the region has demonstrated a high degree of formal 
organization but few acts of intense cooperation the outcome may be moderate.  For example a 
region may have a formal body to address regional implementation of WIA but may not have 
cooperated by sharing data.  This would suggest only a moderate level of cooperation.  On the 
other hand, if the intensity of cooperative acts is high but no formal mechanism exists to 
maintain cooperation into the future or on other initiatives then only moderate cooperation would 
be reported.  Finally, if both a formal arrangement and high intensity of cooperation exist then 
the outcome would be high in terms of the intensity of cooperation.  The figure below is a very 
rudimentary illustration of the potential combinations and outcomes depending on both the 
intensity and formality of the arrangements.  The concept of cooperation runs more along a 
continuum than discrete categories.  However, cooperation has been categorized from no or low 
to high intensity cooperation for the purposes of analysis.   
The relevance of the categories will be illustrated with the findings.  The potential to 
categorize the outcomes and then examine the patterns among the independent variables for 
patterns that contribute to the outcomes will provide valuable insights for policy design and its 
interaction with local conditions.  One example in employment and training policy is that states 
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may have implemented the WIA in either 1999 or 2000 as the legislation allowed.  This may 
have decreased the opportunity to establish a formal entity to coordinate regional policy across 
state borders because the policy was implemented in different years.  As a result some regions 
may have more formal organizing arrangements for achieving cooperation regionally than other 
regions.  If both formality and intensity of acts define the intensity of cooperation then particular 
combinations of factors may lend themselves to specific categories of cooperation as depicted in 
Figure 1.  
A. Methods 
It should be noted that this study is not testing a particular hypothesis but rather is inductive.  
This study uses developed theories to generate hypotheses about what combination of conditions 
are most likely to obtain various levels of cooperation.  This is achieved by examining, 
holistically, several case studies in conjunction with legislative and structural factors.   
To answer these research questions and uncover if there are effects and interactions 
between the legislation and structural factors a matrix of factors drawn from a series of intra- and 
interstate case studies, other scholarly research, and public documents in employment and 
training policy is presented.  The five interstate regions are Chicago (IL-IN), Cincinnati (OH-
KY-IN), Kansas City (MO-KS), Louisville (KY-IN), and St. Louis (MO-IL).  The four intra-
state regions are Cleveland (OH), Indianapolis (IN), Peoria (IL) and Springfield (MO).  The 
region itself is defined as the U.S. Bureau of Census 1990 definition of the metropolitan region.  
These study sites were selected by first identifying interstate regions with a population of one 
million or more in the Midwest region of the United States.  The Midwest was chosen because it 
has a large number of geographically discrete metropolitan regions when compared to other 
regions such as the West or South.  Additionally, by containing the study to sites in the Midwest 
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the study controls for region effects.  The intra-state regions were selected from the same states 
as the interstate regions to control for state effects. This ultimately limits the generalizability of 
the findings but also provides a means to begin to unravel some of the many potential factors that 
influence regional cooperation.  This method allows for the exploration of whether some 
phenomena from well developed theories are common to a set of cases.  
Evidence was gathered to create the case studies from 84 interviews with state and local 
policy experts who provided in-depth knowledge about specific factors affecting cooperation and 
coordination within and among workforce investment areas in the nine metropolitan regions.  
The interviews took place between August of 2002 and July of 2003.5  Information gathered 
from public documents on the states’ implementation strategies such as the states’ five-year 
strategic plans and annual reports were also examined for each of the factors listed in the tables 
and reflect the conditions at that time.  Findings corroborated information from case studies 
conducted by other scholars at or around the time this study.  Information from websites and 
additional informal phone calls to supplement information learned in the interviews were also 
used.  The triangulation of this information provides the evidence for the major points in the 
study.6  
The dependent variable can be seen in Table 1 which provides a brief overview of the 
degree and type of cooperation identified in each of the nine regions.  The measure of the 
intensity of cooperation in this study is a product of both the level of cooperative activities as 
well as the presence and formality of a governing body even if it is not a legal authority that can 
enforce cooperative behavior.  The intensity of cooperation is defined as high if there is a 
permanent body and/or documented development strategy (e.g., regional plan) and broad scope 
of cooperation identified by data from the interviews, case studies, and public documents.  Low 
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cooperation is evident when there is little cooperation and no, or only an informal, organization 
overseeing the activity, development plans, and strategies.  When the interviews and public 
documents do not indicate cooperation is occurring this is noted as “no cooperation detected”. 
[Insert Table 1 about Here] 
The independent variables derived from Mazmanian and Sabatier’s as well as Pekmann’s 
frameworks are classified based on information gathered from interviews, other scholarly 
research, and public documents for each of the regions.  Each structural factor and the degree as 
well as presence of each legislative factor identified by the Mazmanian and Sabatier framework 
were examined.  In order to make the appropriate classification of the level of hierarchal 
integration evidence was drawn from agencies that were working together to achieve needed 
outcomes in employment and training policy.  Did unified plans and/or administrative re-
organizations have an impact or merely outcomes on paper?  To make the determination with 
regard to the financial resources being sufficient or that there is at least a minimum threshold of 
funds for increasing cooperation evidence about funding sources and opportunities for additional 
funds was considered.  Specifically, if interviewees and evidence corroborated the idea that 
funding structures were hampering any hopes of cooperation, then resources were rated as low.  
If resources were being tapped for cooperative endeavors, including grants, then this was 
consider stronger evidence that there was at least a moderate level of resources available.  
Finally, to determine if there was adequate access from outsiders data was examined to 
determine if there was meaningful engagement by “outsiders” to contribute to the process.  In 
other words, were “outsiders” insights’ given consideration and allowed to influence the 
systems?  
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Using the triangulated information a truth table as prescribed by Ragin’s Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis method (1987) was created.7  Thereafter, the table was systematically 
examined for interactions among the legislation’s policy design and state and local structural 
factors related to the intensity of cooperation across intergovernmental jurisdictions within five 
interstate and four intra-state metropolitan regions .  The variation in the explanatory variables 
illuminates some of the differences in the regions’ intensity of cooperation.  However, this 
variation alone cannot account for the vast differences in achieving regional cooperation under 
WIA.  The study of the interaction of factors is much more revealing.  Furthermore, looking at 
both intra and interstate regions it is possible to determine if there are combinations of legislative 
and structural factors that create meaningful patterns for fostering cooperative outcomes in the 
different types of regions.  This broadens our understanding of the applicable concepts from a 
theory to other subsets of regions (Ragin 2004) and potentially expands the number of 
combinations of factors that may present a meaningful pattern.  A single in-depth study of a 
regional economic policy is limited in terms of its ability to advance theory.  However, one or 
additional studies placed in context with others’ research provide a mechanism to advance theory 
and make valid inferences about other cases (King, Keohane, and Verba 2004).  In short, using 
this methodology provides a defendable and replicable means to discover patterns and 
interactions in intergovernmental relations policy that would otherwise remain hidden.   
A. Analysis 
B. Perkmann’s Structural Drivers of Cooperation  
Despite obstacles, WIA has enhanced cooperation across state lines in some areas.  Combined 
Perkmann’s and Mazmanian and Sabatier’s frameworks provide seven variables to analyze for 
patterns that lead to cooperation.  Table 2 identifies different levels of intra- and interstate 
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cooperation by region and combination of factors.  The impact and patterns of the three factors 
from Perkmann’s framework on both interstate and intra-state cooperation is described first.  
Intra-state Cooperation  
In the intra-state regions studied, high intensity cooperation is found in regions with a small 
number of WIBs in two of four cases.  Additionally, high intensity cooperation only occurred 
when the regional actors are the drivers of the cooperative initiatives in the intra-state cases.   
Interviews revealed no cooperation among the nine WIBS or even between the city of Cleveland 
and Cuyahoga County (however the change of leadership with a new Mayor of Cleveland 
sparked hope for collaboration in the future).   
[Insert Table 2 about Here] 
C. Interstate Cooperation 
The interstate regions demonstrate the reverse.  High intensity of regional cooperation in 
interstate areas is associated with a large number of WIBs.  In all three interstate cases with a 
high intensity of cooperation there was a potentially a large number of WIBS (five or more) that 
could cooperate.  The Kansas City region was somewhat different from the other two regions in 
this aspect.  In the case of Kansas City case there was a potential for six WIBs to cooperate, 
however, the most intense cooperation within the region was driven by the local public 
administrators of  two WIBs on the states’ borders that have a history of working together.  In 
the remaining two cases of high intensity cross state border cooperation at least 80 percent of the 
WIBs were participating.   
C. Patterns across Region Type 
It is clear in the nine cases studied that regional actors help achieve a high level of cooperation 
more often than local level actors.  This is the case in four of the five high intensity cases of 
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cooperation.  This is also the case regardless of whether the region is located entirely within one 
state or not.  There is no relationship between the number of jurisdictions in the region and 
intensity of cooperation when considering both the intra- and interstate scenarios.  High 
cooperation is just as likely in small as large scale regions.  However, in both instances (Chicago 
and St. Louis) where there are a large number of WIBs actually participating, as well as 
achievement of a high intensity of cooperation, it turns out that regional actors are the drivers of 
that cooperation.  As such, when looking at the patterns the matrix reveals that more often 
regional level actors are more likely to obtain high levels of cooperation in both intra-state and 
interstate areas.   
B. Mazmanian and Sabatier’s Legislative Variables  
Mazmanian and Sabatier’s legislative variables are also analyzed for patterns that lead to 
cooperation.  Table 2 identifies the way year of implementation, hierarchal integration, 
resources, and access by outsiders across both intra- and interstate may affect cooperation in 
combination with other factors.  The impact and patterns of the four variables drawn from 
Mazmanain and Sabatier’s framework is described here.  
C. Same Implementation Year 
The findings show that interstate regions where states implemented WIA in the same year (either 
early or later) are somewhat more likely to experience higher levels of cooperation.8  This was 
the outcome in four out of the five cases that achieved high intensity cooperation.  One example 
of the way this has played out is illustrated by comparing the case of Cincinnati to St. Louis.  In 
Cincinnati the metropolitan area includes communities in Ohio, Kentucky, and Indiana.  The 
states of Indiana, Kentucky, and Ohio are at different stages of implementing WIA; Indiana and 
Kentucky are early implementing states but Ohio chose to implement WIA when the previous 
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employment and training legislation expired.  The fact that Ohio is facing different constraints 
and opportunities than Kentucky and Indiana is affecting these states’ ability to cooperate 
because they are not working on the same type of issues at the same time.  One interviewee 
noted that: “Kentucky was an early implementer of WIA, one of six to eight states.  Ohio was 
not, so it was hard to participate because we were in different places on the learning curve.  It has 
hindered quality regional work.”  Informal interstate cooperation is apparent in Cincinnati but 
not to the degree reported in St. Louis where both Illinois and Missouri implemented WIA at the 
same time and are experiencing more interstate cooperation.  However, seven of the nine cases 
did implement WIA in the same year, either early or later.  The data reveal that the effect of 
same year implementation does not create a pattern in the intra-state case where all locations in a 
state implement the program in the same year.  This suggests other factors may need to be 
present to realize the gains from this variable, at least in the interstate case.  
C. Hierarchical Integration 
States made use of several methods to achieve more hierarchical integration which allows for the 
re-organization of administrative entities that oversee WIA implementation.  These methods 
ranged from unified plans, to restructuring the oversight of agencies and programs participating 
in the legislative, and even the creation of interagency teams.  In Indiana, the participating 
programs have been housed in one of two agencies since the early 1990s.  However, Indiana 
made use of a unified plan and was the only state in this study to do so. 9 Although Indiana does 
not require a unified plan among all of the required one stop partners, it does try to include as 
many as possible (Ganzglass, Jensen, Ridley, Simon, and Thompson 2001).  Kentucky took a 
different approach. In Kentucky the state’s Secretary for workforce development established a 
state level Cabinet for Workforce Development that houses the majority of the top administrative 
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leaders of the state agencies that work together in the one stop (Kentucky’s Cabinet for 
Workforce Development, Department for Training and ReEmployment 2001, 4).10  Missouri 
consolidated a few departments to create the Division of Workforce Development.  Missouri's 
Division of Workforce Development came about with the consolidation of the functions related 
to WIA from of the Division of Job Development and Training and the Employment Services 
housed within the Division of Employment Security (Missouri Department of Economic 
Development 2001).  Kansas instituted an Interagency Alliance for Planning and Policy 
Development to ensure workforce development policy was compatible with the policies of 
economic development, education reform, and welfare reform statewide.  Similarly to Missouri, 
Illinois WIA administration was transferred to a different agency to consolidate the 
administration of workforce development programs under one agency (Illinois Workforce 
Investment Board 2001, 2-4).11 Additionally, interviews revealed the use of interagency teams 
and the consolidation of programs and close working relationships between several agencies and 
the Governor’s office in Illinois.  Ohio merged the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services and the 
Ohio Department of Human Services to consolidated state administration and coordinate 
workforce development programs by creating one agency called the Ohio Department of Jobs 
and Family Services (ODJFS) (Ohio Department of Jobs and Family Services 2001, 1-5).  
Interviews revealed that this change, which meant two agencies must now learn to work as one, 
was in and of itself hampering cooperation.   
As Table 2 reveals some states have had more hierarchically integration success than 
others, but success has only been moderate at best. Grubb, Badway, Bell, Chi, King, Herr, 
Prince, Kazis, Hicks, and Taylor specifically found in their study as well that, “States are 
sometimes unwilling or unable to impose a uniform policy on different programs with federal 
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funding” (1998, 57).  Evidence from this study provides support for the importance of 
hierarchical integration for achieving desired policy outcomes.  The findings reveal that regions 
in states that have moderate hierarchal integration are more likely to experience higher levels of 
cooperation in both intra and interstate cases such as Missouri.  Six of the nine regions shared 
moderate levels of hierarchical integration.  All five of the regions that demonstrated a high 
intensity of cooperation had achieved a moderate level of hierarchical integration.   
C. Resources 
Mazmanian and Sabatier identify resources as a key aspect for successful implementation 
processes.  Some regions reported adequate access to funds or new funds such as in the case of 
Indianapolis which received additional resources as an incentive to work regionally.  Other 
regions reported success in obtaining grants.  In the cases with aforementioned outcomes 
resources were ranked as moderate.  If there was considerable consternation reported about 
funding, resources were noted as low in Table 2.   In four of the five high intensity cases 
resources were rated as moderate.  Yet one case, Indianapolis, with moderate funding did not 
achieve high intensity cooperation.  One explanation for this stems from the fact that program 
funding for WIA was intended to come through block grants.12 Interviews revealed that in 
reality funding remained separate even though it was channeled through three areas: Adult; 
Dislocated Workers; and Youth.  The term “siloed funding streams” is often used by 
interviewees and refers to the aforementioned discrete funding sources for separate, earmarked 
programs, instead of the funds being combined into block grants as the legislation originally 
intended.  Some interviewees noted that the motivation for the continuation of siloed funding 
stems from reported concerns over the potential dissolution of programs if funding was actually 
consolidated.  This outcome frustrated the ability of administrators to foster cooperation.  
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Program administrators still retained their own source of funds to act unilaterally when 
delivering services and meeting their own particular program objectives even when co-locating 
in one stops.   
Other researchers have found funding issues to be problematic for WIA implementation.  
Mueser and Sharpe noted that, “We heard repeatedly that separate funding silos caused 
operational problems” and that “State cutbacks have reduced workforce staff and leave each 
agency focused on finding ways to meet its own narrow mission” (2004, 128).  Mueser and 
Sharpe also found in their study that restructuring the funding alone cannot solve the problem.  
Issues such as “culture, needs and scope of service provision of these programs” are other serious 
concerns for achieving effective implementation of employment and training policy (2004, 128-
129).   Findings in Table 2 reveal that when resources are moderate as opposed to low they are 
more often associated with the regions demonstrating a high intensity of cooperation such as in 
Chicago. However, this is not always the case as illustrated by the St. Louis region which 
suggests that the interaction of regional actors, moderate administrative structures and access 
may help overcome drawbacks of having low levels of resources for attaining regional 
cooperation.  Additionally, the case of Indianapolis suggests that resources alone are not a silver 
bullet for achieving cooperation either.  Factors beyond funding such as those found by Mueser 
and Sharpe give credence to the importance of legislative design that can foster hierarchical 
integration and supportive decision rules for overcoming obstacles to cooperation.   
C. Access 
Access is a factor that is present in some of the cases but is not consistently associated with a 
high level of cooperation.  In fact only three cases reported moderate levels of access and only of 
one those cases, St. Louis, achieved a high intensity cooperation.  Under WIA, attempts at 
 21 
broadening access to outsiders did not ensure cooperation because that access was sometimes not 
substantive.  Board members themselves cited complications between staff and boards with 
regard to information and ideas. A state policy expert from one state noted that at a board 
meeting:  
Business speaks up and asks, 'what about this?' or 'have we tried this____?'  You can fill 
in the blank with anything.  The experts who are the state bureaucrats say it won't work, 
or we tried that or the regulations won't permit it.  The business leaders come up with an 
idea and the experts drive it back, the ones that actually have to implement the program.  
I've tried to find out why business isn't involved more and two people have told me that 
they don't want to look stupid.  No one wants to appear stupid.  Business should be 
driving the system.     
  
The Social Policy Research Associates also found that “several states encountered difficulty 
keeping many of [the strong business representatives] actively engaged” (2004, x2-x3).  Similar 
outcomes were noted in another study of Indiana (Billen and Nathan, 2004, p. 87).  The Indiana 
study reported that, “Despite efforts to engage employers in Indiana’s workforce development 
system, the general perception is that the business community is minimally involved, and at the 
local level, service providers continue to drive policy and program decisions” (Billen and 
Nathan, 78).  
Ultimately, the access by outsiders to influence WIA implementation varied across 
WIBs. The states and regions in this study exhibit either low access or moderate access that was 
gained through less traditional vehicles such as consortiums and policy groups to expand their 
networks and access to the influence of outsiders.  Subsequently, even though WIA designations 
and other policies were intended to foster access where needed, the decision to institute these 
mechanisms were typically made at the state level.  This left local areas reacting to that decision 
rather than having the latitude to implement a new policy or not as the local area needed.  
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Additionally, the exclusive actions of boards and their staffs actually detracted from meaningful 
access to WIA in some cases.   
A. Conclusions 
Undeniably WIA has helped facilitate both intra- and interstate cooperation across state and local 
government boundaries in some regions.  Peoria and Springfield realized intra-state regional 
cooperation.  Of the interstate cases, St. Louis and Kansas City demonstrated the most 
cooperation.  Even though Kansas City had not developed a formal institution to coordinate 
cooperation, the region demonstrated more interstate cooperation than Cincinnati which had an 
informal institution to coordinate cooperation and Chicago that participated in more ad hoc 
interstate cooperation with Indiana.  But what where the policy design and structural factors that 
contributed to those outcomes?  While the results are mixed as to which factors have an impact 
under which circumstances they do suggest there are some policy design and structural factors 
that can be enhanced to increase the likelihood that regional cooperation will occur under WIA.  
Among these factors are: number of WIBS in the region and focus of actors; same year 
implementation of the act; the amount of hierarchical integration of administrative entities; 
resources; and access from outsiders.   
The number of  WIBs made a difference where in intra-state regions cooperation was 
more likely with fewer WIBs while in the interstate region more regions with more WIBs were 
likely to exhibit cooperative behavior.  Additionally if the actors involved had a regional focus 
for implementing the policy this seemed to drive outcomes in terms of cooperation occurring at 
the regional level.  In other words, actors that looked and worked for cooperation beyond their 
boundaries were much more likely to achieve it than those that did not.  That may seem obvious, 
but regional cooperation did not seem to occur unless those involved saw a need to look beyond 
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their borders for success.  Having states implement the act in same year seemed important as 
well.  If the agencies were implementing their programs in the same year they could develop 
their implementation policies and frameworks to cooperate with other agencies and across 
jurisdictions. When states’ administrative agencies were more hierarchically integrated 
cooperation was more likely.  More closely aligning the mission of the agencies to be under the 
same umbrella appeared to reinforce the need or desirability of cooperating among agencies.  
Agencies that were less hierarchically aligned have been more likely to eschew cooperation as 
their goals were not be interpreted as broader outcomes among agencies tackling the same issue 
from different perspectives.  Regions that had at least a moderate level of resources tended to 
achieve greater levels of cooperation.  Although this was not always the case or even the most 
important factor, having sufficient resources to cooperate and think beyond ones on narrow 
mission and immediate funding needs did seem to contribute to the likelihood of having more 
cooperation.  Finally, access by outsiders seemed only to matter if the access was meaningful.  
The mechanisms to ensure meaningful access did not seem to be in place so it hard to determine 
the value of access in terms of contributing to increased regional cooperation under WIA.  
Evidence suggests that access can play role to fostering cooperation but access alone may not be 
sufficient to ensure cooperation is achieved.   Although none of these factors by themselves are 
the absolute key to cooperation, these structural and legislative factors do seem to have impact 
on increasing the likelihood of regional cooperation under WIA.  It is evident that cooperation is 
beneficial, although difficult to develop and perhaps sustain.  More research that would provide 
an even greater understanding about the factors that can promote cooperation under WIA would 
be an asset.  
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A. Notes 
1 Prime sponsors were state and local governments with a population 100,000 or more that the 
U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) contracted out with to help administer the program. 
2 This study is concerned with WIA as a legislative policy that generates regional cooperation to 
improve outcomes for employers and employees.  Subsequently WIA is referred to throughout 
the study as a policy.  However, it should be noted the implementation of this policy resulted in 
the federal program of the same name.   
3 The act states that: The State may require Local Boards within a designated region…. To: (1) 
Participate in a regional planning process that results in regional performance measures for 
workforce investment activities under title I of WIA.  Regions that meet or exceed the regional 
performance measures may receive regional incentive grants; 2) Share where feasible 
employment and other types of information that will assist in improving the performance of all 
local areas in the designated region on local performance measures (3) Coordinate the provision 
of WIA title I services, including supportive services such as transportation across the boundaries 
of local areas within the designated regions …(b) Two or more States may designate a labor 
market, economic development region, or other appropriate contiguous subarea of the states as 
an interstate region…(d) Unless agreed to by all affected chief elected officials and the 
Governor, these regional planning activities may not substitute for or replace the requirement 
applicable to each local area under other provisions of the WIA (U.S. Department of Labor 1999, 
p. 18697).   
4 Workforce Investment Board area is a designated area for implementing WIA policy. 
5 Survey instrument is available from the author. 
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6 I interviewed experts across the sectors of business, labor, education, economic development, 
community based organizations, state and local one-stop partners, staff to the workforce boards, 
and public officials in each of the fives states and across the regions.  Initial interviewees were 
identified from staff to the participating workforce boards and the snowball technique was used 
to increase the variety and number of interviewee perspectives thereafter.  I used elite interview 
techniques as described by Dexter (1970).  Interviewees were assured confidentiality and 
therefore are not referenced individually.  This method provided a wealth of inductive qualitative 
evidence derived from the participants’ perspectives as opposed to the researcher.  The explicit 
method used is closest to what has been termed the presturctured case.  This method is used 
when the researcher has expert knowledge from working in the field and when it is important 
that the research uses multiple case studies for comparability across cases for drawing conclusion 
(Miles and Huberman 1994, 83-84).  To guard against bias or drawing erroneous conclusions 
when using this method, it is necessary to triangulate information from other sources such as 
public documents as was performed here. Additionally other scholarly research corroborated the 
findings validity (Miles and Huberman 1994, 266-267).     
7 Because Mazmanian and Sabatier’s framework prescribes ordinal classification as opposed to 
nominal classification of the presence or absence of a factor I have forgone the use of upper case 
versus lower case letters to describe the outcomes in the table.  Descriptive labels are used to 
instead.  
8 That is some states implemented the Act for the Program Year starting July 1, 1999 or “early” 
while other states did not implement WIA until the mandated Program Year July 1, 2000. 
9 A unified plan provides a formal means to strategically align programs and systems to meet 
workforce development goals. 
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10 One stops are physical locations that operate as career centers.  They provide information 
about and access to job training, education, and employment services for employers and 
employees alike at a single neighborhood office. 
11 It should be noted that this did not dissolve previously existing agencies or their functions 
such as the Illinois Bureau of Employment Services. 
12 WIA consolidates over sixty programs into three targeted block grants in its attempt to create 
a comprehensive employment and training system (Congressional Record 1998, p. H6865).
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